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DISAGGREGATING "CHURCH" AND "CULTURE"
Mark V. Tushnet*
Michael McConnell's typically provocative attempt to map the
possibilities for First Amendment jurisprudence uses a group of
metaphors drawn from H. Richard Niebuhr. 1 I believe the map's
accuracy would be enhanced if the points where Niebuhr's meta-
phors are unsuitable for First Amendment jurisprudence were more
carefully elaborated. This would disaggregate both the "church"
and the "culture" to which Niebuhr and McConnell direct atten-
tion. After sketching how that could be done, I will suggest that this
more elaborated view offers a different perspective on the "Church
Apart From Culture" category with which McConnell opens his
discussion.
.As McConnell notes, Neibuhr's categories are not themselves
suitable for First Amendment jurisprudence because Neibuhr was
concerned only with the Christian church whereas First Amendment
jurisprudence must deal with the fact of religious pluralism.' That
observation, however, may be more damaging to McConnell's enter-
prise than he acknowledges. When Niebuhr discusses "the [Chris-
tian] church apart from culture" and the like, he can also properly
have in mind a single entity, the Christian church, counterposed to,
or interacting with, every other social institution in the public
sphere. This includes other churches, the government, the mass me-
dia, and other public bodies. Of course, Niebuhr's analysis requires
that the single Christian church have available to it a range of pos-
sible ways of relating to those other institutions. However, his dis-
cussion necessarily takes place within the tradition of the Christian
church, which is understood to be a single tradition whose members
participate in dialogue with each other.
In contrast, when we consider a religiously pluralist society, it is
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., M.A., 1971, Yale University.
1. Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV, 191 (1992) (analyzing First Amendment juris-.
prudence based on metaphors presented in H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951)).
2. Id. at 193.
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exceedingly difficult to formulate a single stance of how the "other"
relates to the rest of society. The most direct analogy to Neibuhr
suggests that we ought to consider the different ways a plurality of
churches could relate to the culture. For obvious reasons, this type
of analysis is unpromising. Precisely because there is a plurality of
churches, there will be a plurality of ways of relating to Neibuhr's
"culture." At most, we would end up with lists of particular
churches that relate to culture in each way. Indeed, much of Profes-
sor McConnell's discussion proceeds in that way. He offers examples
of different churches some of which have stood apart from culture,
some of which have stood in conflict with culture, and so on down
through Niebuhr's various categories.'
That enterprise is interesting, but I am not sure what lessons
about First Amendment jurisprudence we are to draw from it. Hav-
ing seen the problem of pluralism from the side of the churches,
perhaps we ought to be receptive to arguments that First Amend-
ment jurisprudence should be similarly pluralistic. However, there
are two difficulties with that suggestion. First, the course of Estab-
lishment Clause litigation demonstrates that some forms of interac-
tion necessarily exclude others.' Indeed, churches end up on differ-
ent sides of Establishment Clause controversies because some see
the government's position as rejecting the claims of religious plural-
ism. Second, and probably more important, the argument for plural-
ism that I have constructed by analogy to Niebuhr comes, if at all,
from within the pluralism of religious traditions. Similarly, I think
the First Amendment argument for pluralism must come from
within the scope of our constitutional traditions. Under this analysis,
McConnell's pluralist modification of Niebuhr would then be a
thought-provoking analogy, but not much more.
Furthermore, in describing the category "Church Apart From
Culture," McConnell suggests that arguments against a wider role
for churches in the public sphere are misguided because "it is
equally possible to understand religion as an organic part of the cul-
3. id.
4. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (invalidating the inclusion of nonsectarian
invocations and benediction in the form of prayer in public school graduation ceremonies). Al-
lowing this type of interaction between the state and religion would exclude from the graduation
ceremony students who felt that participating would force them to pray in a manner their con-
sciences would not allow. Id. at 2658. Prohibiting it excludes those who believe it necessary to




ture . . ."' I would think, though, that it is not only "equally pos-
sible" to understand religion in that way; it is necessary to under-
stand it in that way. Conversely, to contend that "the religious
world view is radically discontinuous from the perspectives of the
rest of the community"6 is incoherent. In a religiously pluralist soci-
ety, there is no "rest of" the community at all, just different seg-
ments of the community with different perspectives."
The pluralist modification of Niebuhr is one form of disaggregat-
ing his categories. For the purposes of Niebuhr's dialogue within the
Christian church, setting up the categories to counterpose "the
church" to "the public sphere" is entirely sensible. McConnell's as-
sumption of pluralism means that for First Amendment purposes,
"the church" must be disaggregated. McConnell's descriptions re-
veal the obvious first step: distinguishing between mainstream and
nonmainstream religions. Having done so, we will place on McCon-
nell's map one area where the public sphere accommodates main-
stream religions, another area where it takes a stance of conflict
with nonmainstream religions, still other areas where it is aligned
with mainstream religions and some nonmainstream ones, and so on
down through Niebuhr's categories. This map will dissipate some of
the descriptive confusion in McConnell's account; for instance, he
indicates that sometimes the Court uses the "Church Apart From
Culture" model, and sometimes it uses the "Church and Culture
Accommodating" model.
As with "church," I think "culture" must also be disaggregated.
In a pluralist society, different churches will have various forms of
interaction with a range of other social institutions. For present pur-
poses, I find it helpful to identify three such institutions: the govern-
ment, popular culture, and high culture.' Some churches may be
5. McConnell, supra note 1, at 197.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. 1 think part of the difficulty here arises because McConnell does not carefully define "cul-
ture." His definition includes "the institutions that shape the normative understandings of the
community" but excludes "what we do and believe in our own homes and churches." Id. at 194.
From this definition, I think it directly follows that the "Church Apart From Culture" position
will be incoherent, because churches, defined as outside culture, necessarily "shape the normative
understandings" of some people in the community. Therefore, churches are necessarily part of
culture.
8. See generally LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, HIGHBROW/LOWBROW: THE EMERGENCE OF CUL-
TURAL HIERARCHY IN AMERICA 241 (1988) (categorizing cultural groups and institutions as ei-
ther "high" or "popular"). Levine notes that institutions of popular culture are often equated with
accessibility; that is, their ideas, rituals, and attitudes are easily accessible to the masses. In con-
trast, institutions of high culture are characterized by inaccessibility, their language, knowledge
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"apart from" the government but "aligned with" the institutions of
popular culture, others may be "in conflict with" the institutions of
high culture but "aligned with" the government, and so on through
the various permutations.
This disaggregation is important because without it the threat to
churches from any particular institution may readily be exagger-
ated. For example, government denials of tax-exempt status for
some churches might look less discriminatory if they were seen as
an aspect of church interaction with the entire range of social insti-
tutions. The shock value of such a denial is also dissipated if the
institutions of popular or high culture provide material or ideologi-
cal support for those churches affected by the denial.
McConnell's failure to disaggregate "culture" may rest on his
judgment that, whatever the conceptual possibilities may be, the, in-
stitutions of the public sphere in the contemporary United States
have enough basic commitments on church-related issues in com-
mon to justify treating them as "culture" in the large. His opening
sentence, that "[1]awyers naturally [assume] ...that legal princi-
ples ...are the primary, perhaps the only, normative authority to
which we can refer for the organizing principles of society,"9 seems
to rest on that judgment, The argument I have developed so far
rejects that proposition in some ways.
I confess to wondering about the accuracy of McConnell's obser-
vation. One can always find some lawyers asserting that chutrch
leaders violate the principles of liberal society when they take public
positions on social issues that touch on matters of concern wii:hin
their faith traditions. Yet one can also find lawyers asserting exactly
the opposite, that such actions are entirely consistent with liberal
principles.10
Lawyers sensitive to the varied sources of normative authority in
pluralist society understand that the relations among those sources
of authority can be extremely complex. From my vantage point, for
example, it seems that the institutions of high culture, including the
leading institutions of legal education, are "in conflict with" most
requirements, and rituals are not easily assimilated by the public at large. Id. at 230-41. Levine
states that certain professions, such as professors, lawyers, engineers, and scientists, have rituals
and knowledge requirements qualifying them as institutions of "high culture." Id. at 241.
9. McConnell, supra note 1, at 191.
10. For a more extended presentation of my views on this issue, see Mark V. Tushnet, The
Limits of the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic, in THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE
MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 191 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1991).
[Vol. 42:235
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churches. In contrast, the institutions of popular culture are "al-
igned with" mainstream churches, and the institutions of govern-
ment mostly "accommodate" mainstream churches."
I wonder what normative implications we might draw from this
more complex map of interactions. In a religiously pluralist society,
any particular pattern will constitute an endorsement of the norma-
tive stance of some churches and a rejection of the stance of others.
Therefore, the only way to devise proper First Amendment jurispru-
dence is to determine which pattern is normatively desirable. Again,
the fact that a proposed pattern is consistent with the normative
stance of a church cannot count against its adoption. This is a point
made most obvious, as McConnell says, by the Supreme Court in
Harris v. McRae. 2 Harris rejected the claim that a statute could
violate the Establishment Clause if it was consistent with religiously
derived judgments of specific churches.'3 In addition, and although
this is a more difficult issue, I believe that, there is no reason to rule
out religiously derived arguments for the normative correctness of
some particular pattern of interaction. In any event, with McCon-
nell's map in hand, and aided by his discussion, we are at least in a
position to conduct the normative battle on a known terrain.
I now want to shift focus and examine in more detail a single part
of the terrain. Consider an alternative understanding of the category
"Church Apart From Culture." Here the church stands completely
independent of other social institutions. It is not that church and
other institutions are "separated," which conveys an image of insti-
tutions occupying but dividing the same terrain. Rather, the church
and other institutions simply do not occupy the same terrain. Each
says to the other, "You do in your jurisdiction what you think ap-
propriate, and we will do in ours what we think appropriate."
The normative judgment that animates this version of "Church
Apart From Culture" is that culture, the state in particular, makes
11. See WADE CLARK ROOF & WILLIAM MCKINNEY. AMERICAN MAINLINE RELIGION: ITS
CHANGING SHAPE AND FUTURE 107-16 (1987). (discussing how the constituencies of church de-
nominations change as their social characteristics and relation to society change). Roof and Mc-
Kinney observe that a new "knowledge class," consisting of scientists and professionals, has
emerged during this century. This group is secularized in viewpoint, desiring a less prominent role
for religion in society. This viewpoint is at odds with the more popular and mainstream religions
which tend to be more conservative in attitude, desiring that religion play a stronger role in soci-
ety. Id. at 114-15.
12. 448 U.S. 297 (1981).
13. Id. at 319-20 (holding that the fact that abortion funding restrictions coincide with Catho-
lic religious tenets does not, without more, contravene the Establishment Clause).
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no valid normative claim whatever on the believer."' Of course other
institutions, the state in particular, make demands of believers, and
believers must accommodate themselves to those demands. This ac-
commodation, however, is merely prudential.
To McConnell, the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Di-
vision v. Smith'5 exemplifies a rejection of the "Church Apart From
Culture" position. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that laws
prohibiting the use of peyote do not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment when applied to religious groups
using the drug in traditional religious ceremonies. 6 To me, however,
it exemplifies the position itself. In my version of First Amendnent
jurisprudence, each institution defines its jurisdiction for itself.
Under those circumstances, conflicts between the church and other
institutions are inevitable. The church makes a moral claim on its
members, asserting that the matter lies within its jurisdiction. The
state makes a contradictory moral claim, asserting that the matter
lies within its jurisdiction. In Smith, the state says, "This, the regu-
lation of drug use, comes within our jurisdiction. We have decided
what's appropriate, and that's the end of it."
However, my presentation still leaves open an important interpre-
tive point. Who are the "we" who decide what is appropriate? For
the majority in the Smith case, the "we" is the legislature of Ore-
gon; for the critics of that decision, the "we" is akin to "the people
of the United States as they have expressed their will in a Constitu-
tion that overrides transient preferences in order to serve the more
enduring values of religious liberty." Thus, defining the "Church
Apart From Culture" category as I do does not imply that the
Smith decision was right or wrong. Evaluating the decision from the
"Church Apart From Culture" perspective requires further elabora-
tion of the interpretive question.
One way to develop my position is to point out that it plainly
allows both the culture and the government to decide to forego the
exercise of authority within its jurisdiction. Thus, it does not pre-
clude government accommodations of religion." Yet believers who
14. In the Jewish tradition, this is one interpretation, though not the only one, of the legal
principle "the law of the land is the law." For a more detailed discussion of this interpretation, see
GIL GRAFF, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: DINA DE-MALKHUTA DINA IN JEWISH LAW
1750-1848 (1985).
15. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
16. Id. at 890.
17. For present purposes it is unnecessary to distinguish between permissible accommodations
240 [Vol. 42:235
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take the "Church Apart From Culture" position ought to be quite
skeptical about such accommodations. Believers who seek such ac-
commodations from the state are in the position of supplicants to
the state. They are, metaphorically, idolaters.
Yet, as McConnell points out: "It may be unseemly for the be-
liever to ask for accommodation. It is not unseemly for his fellow
citizens to provide it."' 18 Even so, believers who take the "Church
Apart From Culture" perspective might still be uncomfortable even
with accommodations they do not seek. When culture grants such
accommodations, it lowers the price we have to pay for our beliefs.
It may thereby diminish or trivialize the beliefs in our own eyes.
This is especially true when accommodations are granted as a re-
sult of balancing competing social interests, and even more intensely
when the courts rather than legislatures grant exemptions. Consider
how the discussion of a proposed accommodation goes in the balanc-
ing mode: "Although important to believers, the practice we are
thinking of accommodating really is not all that important to soci-
ety; that is, the rest of us really do not think that the practice really
is all that important. We therefore can accommodate it - a prac-
tice we regard as relatively trivial - without impairing our pursuit
of our more important social goals."'" The rhetoric of such discus-
sions consists of a passing acknowledgement of the practice's impor-
tance to those peculiar believers who find it important, coupled with
a practical minimization of its importance.
The problem is exacerbated in adjudication because, as McCon-
nell says, "The courts are an arm of the state.""0 However, the judi-
ciary also has one special characteristic. Unlike legislators, when
judges issue decisions, they explain what they are doing. McConnell
of religion, those chosen at their discretion by legislators, and mandatory accommodations, those
imposed by courts interpreting the Constitution. In the present context the permissible/mandatory
distinction raises only questions about how the state chooses to organize itself, questions about
which the "Church Apart From Culture" perspective offers no answers (because they are ques-
tions that arise solely within the jurisdiction of the state).
18. McConnell, supra note 1, at 214.
19. Sometimes the need for accommodation arises because of a mindless application of a gen-
eral rule, not because anyone actually engaged in balancing and found the social goal more impor-
tant than an accommodation. The Air Force regulation in Goldman v. Weinberger, prohibiting the
wearing of headgear indoors and its application preventing Jewish officers from wearing a yar-
mulke, exemplifies such mindlessness. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Supreme Court decision was not
mindless however; although the Court upheld the regulation as applied, it balanced accommodat-
ing an individual serviceman's religious beliefs with the military's perceived interest in maintain-
ing a uniform appearance. Id. at 509-10.
20. McConnell, supra note 1, at 202.
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demonstrates that courts will never accommodate religious practices
on issues that are important to the government. Judicially imposed
accommodations will therefore occur only when the judges believe,
contrary to what legislators may believe, that the issues and prac-
tices are relatively unimportant. The rhetorical structure of the
judges' explanation is likely to be straightforward: "The practice to
be accommodated is really quite trivial; we do not understand why
anyone is getting excited about it." The "anyone" here is formally
directed to the legislature, but in practice it is directed at the believ-
ers as well. In short, proponents of the "Church Apart From Cul-
ture" view might be concerned that explicit judicial accommoda-
tions of religious practices will ultimately undermine the sturdy
independence of the church that they wish to defend.
McConnell's response is that in the absence of accommodations,
government decisions will have "profoundly unequal effects across
denominations."'" This, McConnell asserts, will offset the inevitable
inequality in developing accommodations, and he argues that "the
best [ought not] be the enemy of the good." 2 Yet, from the
"Church Apart From Culture" perspective, it is unclear that accom-
modations are "the good." The argument for accommodations, par-
ticularly for judicially imposed accommodations, typically ignores
the cost that arises when legislators, or even more important here,
judges, articulate their reasons for their actions. Legislatures can
act mindlessly; courts must explain what they are doing. In Smith,
the state legislature communicated nothing about the relative value
it placed on drug control and religious practice when it adopted a
general ban on drug use.2 3 In contrast, Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion did offer such an explanation. In essence, she said that
although she regretted imposing this burden on religion, the impera-
tives of the war on drugs were so great as to overcome the burden.2 4
Because courts are arms of the government, they are likely to of-
fer such "explanations" with some regularity. It is true that some
religious practices a bit removed from the mainstream will receive
judicial protection. However, practices further from the mainstream
21. Id. at 220.
22. Id.
23. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (:;tat-
ing that under the reasoning of the majority, the government could prohibit, without justification,
conduct mandated by an individual's religious beliefs, so long as the prohibition was generally
applicable).
24. Id. at 908.
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will not be protected. In effect, government action will intrude upon
these practices, and by explaining the necessity of the intrusion, the
courts will set the force of articulate government power against reli-
gious practice. Thus, a proponent of the "Church Apart From Cul-
ture" view might well conclude that the benefits to be gained from
the occasional judicial accommodation of religious practices are out-
weighed by the costs that arise when courts are licensed to engage
in discussions about every possible religious practice.
I must conclude by noting that McConnell has provided a map of
the terrain. In the first part of this response, I have suggested how
the resolution of the map might be increased by disaggregating
"church" and "culture." Treating the analysis as a description, we
might well conclude that sometimes our society has found itself in
one part of the territory and sometimes it has found itself elsewhere.
Therefore, the map by itself offers no normative guidance. However,
the second part of the response sketches an argument about where
we ought to go, map in hand. That argument necessarily draws on
normative resources outside the scope of McConnell's intriguing
presentation. 5 The major work to be done requires using those
resources.
25. To the extent that McConnell offers normative judgments, he too draws on such resources.
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